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Article:  Living in Interesting Times

Cases:
KELLEY             T.C. Memo. 2005-235.
BONGARD         124 T.C. No.8.
JELKE              T.C. Memo. 2005-131.
SCHUTT           T.C. Memo. 2005-126.
STRANGI IV      417 F. 3d 468 (5th Cir. 07/15/2005).
NOBLE              T.C. Memo. 2005-2.

LIVING IN INTERESTING TIMES

The ancient Chinese proverb “May you live in interesting times” rings true for estate planners. The estate tax post-2010 remains unresolved. Important Tax and Circuit Court valuation decisions are viewed by some as inconsistent. Proven planning strategies are often reexamined and those already in place revisited.

What do we see or hear at MPI? The IRS is auditing more gift tax returns, targeting family asset-based entities, checking to see if Section 2036 (retained life interest) can be applied and possibly questioning valuation discounts.

The IRS is perhaps emboldened by its successes in Strangi, Bongard and other 2036 cases. However, when the facts are good and 2036 is not involved, valuation is the issue and the appraisal is on trial. In these times of heightened IRS scrutiny, it is more important than ever for clients to proceed with a strong appraisal.

Recent Valuation Settlements

Estate of Kelley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-235. Filed October 11, 2005.

The validity of an all cash family limited partnership funded by the decedent three months before death was never challenged. Valuation discounts were the only issue. The estate used a 53.5% discount (25% minority interest and 38% lack of marketability) while the IRS was at 25.2% (12% and 15%). Judge Vasquez’ decision was 32.2% (12% and 23%). The Judge noted that a lack of marketability study of private placement transactions by Dr. Mukesh Bajaj divides the transactions into three groups according to discount size. The decedent’s partnership was found to be in the middle group from which a 20% discount was selected. An upward adjustment of 3% was made to account for the following factors specific to the partnership:

COMMENT: A 32.2% discount for an all cash partnership is a good result. This Tax Court decision is confusing, since the judge disregards the taxpayer’s reliance on restricted stock studies (because they involve private placement transactions of public companies), but then relies on the Bajaj study, which is also based on private placement transactions involving publicly traded operating companies.


Estate of Bongard v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. No. 8. Filed March 15, 2005.

The Section 2036(a) “bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration” exception gets most of the attention in this case’s majority, concurring and dissenting opinions. The IRS had assessed a $53,000,000 estate tax deficiency by virtue of its contention that the decedent’s contributions of stock in his electronic materials packaging company (EMPAK) to a new holding company (WCB Holdings) and family limited partnership (BFLP) were transfers of a retained interest, did not meet the bona fide sale exception and should be ignored.

Recognizing that EMPAK’s potential for growth would be enhanced by positioning it for an outside liquidity event, Mr. Bongard arranged for the transfer of the family’s EMPAK stock to WCB Holdings in exchange for voting (Class A) and nonvoting (Class B) membership units. The next day he and a family trust funded BFLP with a portion of their Class B units for a 99% limited partnership interest and 1% general partnership interest, respectively. Mr. Bongard died unexpectedly two years later.

The Court reviewed recent 2036(a) decisions, including Harper, Strangi, Kimbell, Thompson and Stone, and concluded that the WCB Holdings exchange was motivated by a “legitimate and significant nontax reason” (positioning EMPAK for a corporate liquidity event) and therefore satisfied the bona fide sale exception of Section 2036(a).

On the other hand, the BFLP transfer was viewed as a “recycling of value” transaction (as in Harper and Thompson) because Mr. Bongard’s relationship to his Class B units did not really change. Estate tax savings appeared to be the motivating factor for creating BFLP, an entity that had no “investment plan,” never “functioned as a business enterprise” and performed no “meaningful economic activity.” The Court went on to find an implied agreement to retain enjoyment of the transferred units under Section 2036(a)(1).

COMMENT: Since the transfers were one day apart and presumably part of an overall plan, assigning a different motive to each transfer seems unrealistic. Having a good non-tax reason in the mix should have allowed the Court to approve both transfers.


Estate of Jelke v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2005-131. Filed May 31, 2005.

Should the full amount of potential capital gains taxes be deducted in calculating the net asset value of a C corp investment holding company which owns marketable securities? If a historic security sales turnover rate of 6% per year would likely continue and an appraiser is to value the interest of a decedent who could not have forced liquidation, Judge Gerber would limit the deduction to the present value of the future capital gains tax liability.

Frazier Jelke owned 6.44% of Commercial Chemical Co. whose assets were $179 million in marketable securities and $12 million cash. The potential tax on built-in gains was $51 million. The IRS determined the present value of the tax to be $21 million. Judge Gerber went along with the IRS and distinguished the Dunn case (301 F.3d 339) where the Fifth Circuit said an asset-based valuation approach necessarily assumes liquidation on the valuation date and therefore requires a dollar for dollar reduction for the entire amount of tax. Some of the Judge’s comments on Dunn are:

“We are not bound or compelled to follow the holdings of a Court of Appeals to which our decision is not appealable.”

“The Court of Appeals’ reasoning and holding in Estate of Dunn applied to a majority interest. There is no need to express agreement or disagreement with the automatic use of an assumption of liquidation when using an asset-based approach to value a majority interest, because we are valuing a small minority interest . . . insufficient to cause liquidation.”

The estate’s valuation expert applied 25% and 35% discounts for minority interest and lack of marketability, respectively, while the IRS expert was at 5% and 10%. Judge Gerber’s decision of 10% and 15% (23.5% combined) seems to favor the IRS.

COMMENT: A 15% lack of marketability discount is quite low in our experience.


Estate of Schutt v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2005-126. Filed May 26, 2005.

We have seen several important Tax Court decisions involving Section 2036 and family limited partnerships in the last few years. Perhaps in reaction to those cases, lawyers, accountants and trust officers for the Schutt/DuPont family developed a significant record of their advice, discussions and meetings concerning tax and non-tax reasons for establishing two Delaware business trusts (Schutt I and Schutt II) funded with $91 million in DuPont and Exxon stock. When the IRS argued that Porter Schutt retained a life interest in his $42 million share of contributed stock, his advisors’ paper trail was key in helping the Tax Court find that Section 2036’s “bona fide sale” exception had been satisfied.

In March 1998 Mr. Schutt and various DuPont family trusts of which he was advisor and Wilmington Trust Company trustee contributed DuPont stock to Schutt I and Exxon stock to Schutt II. Mr. Schutt, a buy and hold investor, wanted to maintain the family’s large holdings in DuPont and Exxon and was “displeased” with sales of the stock by family members, preferring that they live on their income. Creation of the Delaware business trusts had the potential of extending termination dates of the trusts at Wilmington Trust Company and allowed Mr. Schutt to perpetuate his investment philosophy. This important non-tax reason was very well documented in memos and letters during a planning period which began in late 1996. Mr. Schutt died in April 1999.

Some of Judge Wherry’s responses to an IRS argument that Mr. Schutt’s main focus was on tax savings are:

“….the record fails to reflect that such issues predominated in decedent’s thinking and desires.”

“Rather, there is a notable focus on matters such as decedent’s desire for investment control.”

“Regardless of whether Schutt I and II transactions should be subjected to heightened scrutiny appropriate to intrafamily situations, the record here is sufficient to show that the negotiations and discussions were more than a mere façade.”

COMMENT: Based on stipulated estate tax values for Mr. Schutt’s interests in the trusts, the total discount from net asset value was approximately 32%.


Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, 417 F. 3d 468 (5th Cir. 07/15/2005).

This should turn out to be the last of the Strangi decisions. Most of us knew all along that bad facts would make the estate a loser under Section 2036(a)(1). What interested us was whether the Fifth Circuit would bless the Tax Court’s application of Section 2036(a)(2) to the Strangi facts. Here is a quick review:

Mr. Strangi died two months after transferring 98% of his assets to an FLP in exchange for a 99% limited partnership interest and 47% of the corporate general partner. Strangi was seriously ill at the time of the transfer. A son-in-law with Strangi’s general power of attorney was manager of the corporate general partner and had sole authority to make distribution decisions. Strangi’s four children owned the other 53% of the corporate general partner and served as directors with Strangi. One of the partnership’s assets was Strangi’s residence. The partnership paid Strangi’s personal expenses and, after his death, estate expenses.

Strangi I, 115 TC 478 (2000).
The Tax Court said the partnership was legitimate and allowed a 31% discount in valuing Strangi’s interests. It further ruled that a claim based on Section 2036(a) (retention of the use and enjoyment of the FLP assets) was not timely filed.

Strangi II, 293 F. 3d 279 (2002).
The Fifth Circuit remanded for further consideration under Section 2036.

Strangi III, TCM 2003-145.
The FLP was ignored and the transferred assets were brought back into Strangi’s taxable estate under both Section 2036(a)(1) (retention of income) and 2036(a)(2) (retention of control over income). An implied understanding that Strangi would retain the income from the property he transferred was sufficient for Section 2036 (a)(1). Furthermore, because Strangi, acting through his attorney-in-fact and/or with his children, retained the right to determine who would benefit from the property and the income generated therefrom, Judge Cohen ruled that Section 2036(a)(2) applied as well.

Strangi IV
The Fifth Circuit affirmed after a careful review of the facts:

“We cannot say that the Tax Court clearly erred in holding that Strangi and his children had some implicit understanding by which Strangi would continue to use his assets as needed, and therefore retain ‘possession or enjoyment’ within the meaning of §2036(a)(1) …. or in finding that Strangi’s transfer of assets to SFLP lacked a substantial non-tax purpose.”

“Because we hold that the transferred assets were properly in the taxable estate under §2036(a)(1), we do not reach the Commissioner’s alternative contention that Strangi retained the ‘right .… to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property’, thus triggering inclusion under §2036(a)(2).”

COMMENT: Many professionals are disappointed with the Fifth Circuit’s failure to address Section 2036(a)(2).


Estate of Noble v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2005-2. Filed January 6, 2005.

The Noble estate sold its 11.6% interest in Glenwood State Bank for $1.1 million 14 months after death, having turned down an earlier offer of $878,000, and yet relied, in part, on two small (1% and .7%) and much lower-priced pre-death transactions in its determination of fair market value for estate tax purposes.

The Court agreed with the IRS that the $1.1 million sale was the “best indicium” of fair market value at the time of death since it was within a reasonable time of (“near”) the valuation date, was at arm’s length and no “material change of circumstances” occurred between the two dates.

The Court’s only adjustment to the sale price was to discount the proceeds for inflation. The estate incorrectly thought case law supported the notion that relevant transactions must be pre-death and sellers need not be knowledgeable nor their shares comparable in size to those being valued.


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